FOOD FOR THOUGHT: INTELLECTUAL
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“Always remember: If you’re alone in the kitchen and you
drop the lamb, you can always just pick it up. Who’s going
to know?”
— Julia Child1

ABSTRACT
As any chef will tell you, cooking and food preparation is a
creative, sometimes innovative, endeavor. Much thought and time
is invested in selecting ingredients, developing the process for
preparing the dish, and designing an interesting or appealing look
and feel for a food item. If this is true, then it should come as no
surprise that recipes, food designs, and other culinary creations
can be protected by various forms of intellectual property,
namely: trade secrets, design and utility patents, trade dress, but
usually not copyright. This article considers how intellectual
property law has been applied to protect recipes and food designs,
along with broader issues relating to how these rights may
overlap and their implications for competition.

INTRODUCTION
“One cannot think well, love well, sleep well, if one has not dined
well.”2 We are a society that has become increasingly obsessed with food.
Food and cooking shows are television’s fastest-growing subgenre.3 Food
blogging has become a lucrative industry.4 One can go to any fine dining
establishment and observe patrons taking pictures of their food and posting
those pictures on their social media before digging in. A unique recipe
might be the core asset of a specialty restaurant.5 Not unexpectedly, chefs,
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Mike Sager, Julia Child: What I’ve Learned, ESQUIRE (Aug. 15, 2014),
https://www.esquire.com/food-drink/interviews/a1273/julia-child-quotes0601/#ixzz1uygKZ7hJ.
2
VIRGINIA WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE’S OWN 23 (Harcourt, Inc. 1929).
3
Michael O’Connell, Welcome to Peak Food TV: Inside Hollywood’s Growing
Hunger for Culinary Shows, HOLLYWOOD REP. (July 19, 2019, 6:00 AM),
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/features/gordon-ramsay-more-hollywoodsgrowing-hunger-food-tv-shows-1225214.
4
One food blog, Pinch of Yum, reports that in just one month (November 2016),
it brought in over $95,000 in revenue. See Jillian Kramer, How to Make a Living
as
a
Food
Blogger,
FOOD & WINE
(Mar.
22,
2018),
https://www.foodandwine.com/news/make-living-food-blogger.
5
Some examples of well-known “signature dishes” include the Brown Derby’s
cobb salad, Spago’s house-smoked salmon pizza, and Nobu’s black cod with
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restaurant owners, and others involved in the culinary world often consider
their recipes and food designs to be creatively invented works of art. As
such, can recipes and food design be protected by intellectual property
rights that are available to more traditional inventions and forms of art?
This article explores whether two aspects of food preparation –
recipes and the design of the food itself – are eligible for protection by the
principal forms of intellectual property. In Part I, this article explores the
various forms of available intellectual property protection: trade secrets,
copyright, utility and design patents, and trademarks and trade dress.
Next, we analyze whether and how intellectual property rights have been
used to protect recipes and food design. The article concludes that the
availability of intellectual property protection for recipes and food design,
and the requirements for such protection, varies greatly depending on the
form of protection sought. For both recipes and food design, copyright
offers limited or no protection. Recipes may find some protection with
trade secrets and utility patents. Food design may be eligible for both
design patent and trade dress protection. The strongest protection for food
designs may arise from some combination of the two.
In Part II, this article explores whether there should be intellectual
property protection for recipes and food design at all and, if so, under what
circumstances. There is existing intellectual property protection for
various items: dinosaur-shaped crackers, heart-shaped candy canes,
irregular-shaped hamburger patties, cupcakes with swirl icing, hot dogs
with crisscross cuts, among other food designs. We consider whether such
broad protection serves or hinders the purposes of intellectual property
protection. Finally, we address how existing intellectual property law
enables an owner of a food design to circumvent the Supreme Court’s
requirement that product designs have secondary meaning before they are
entitled to trademark protection by permitting the owner to initially seek
design patent protection, use its period of limited monopoly to develop
secondary meaning, and thereafter obtain potentially infinite trademark
protection.

I. AN OVERVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION FOR
RECIPES AND FOOD DESIGN
The best known forms of available intellectual property protection
are trade secrets, copyrights, utility and design patents, and trademarks and
trade dress. In this part, we consider whether and to what extent
intellectual property rights have been used to protect recipes and food
designs. In practice, we find that there is uneven protection for food as
well as important limitations on that protection.

A. Trade Secrets
Trade secret protection promotes the diffusion of knowledge,
economic development, and the maintenance of standards of commercial
ethics.6 A trade secret is business information with actual or potential
miso. See Beth Kracklauer, 9 Signature Dishes, SAVEUR (Mar. 10, 2009),
https://www.saveur.com/article/Kitchen/9-Signature-Dishes.
6
See generally Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481–93 (1974).
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economic value and is subject to reasonable measures to maintain its
secrecy.7 As long as the information is not generally known to the public,
has a potential economic benefit or competitive advantage to the business,
and is subject to reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy, trade secret
protection can last indefinitely.8 There is no registration or examination
process required.9 Trade secrets encompass technical and financial data,
recipes, chemical formulas, compilations of data, computer programs,
devices, methods and systems, techniques, processes, and lists of actual or
potential customers or suppliers.10
The information must be sufficiently secret so that the owner
derives actual or potential economic value because it is not generally
known or readily ascertainable.11 Finally, to ensure that the information is
not generally known or easily discovered, the owner must make reasonable
efforts to maintain the secrecy of the information.12 Liability for trade
secret misappropriation results when a person acquires another’s trade
secret by improper means or uses or discloses it without the trade secret
owner’s permission.13 Improper means include obtaining the trade secret
by “bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement” to breach a duty to
keep the information secret or industrial espionage.14 However, liability
for misappropriation can be negated by proof of reverse engineering of a
lawfully acquired product containing the trade secret,15 “or through [the]
independent discovery of the same information constituting the trade
secret.”16
As to food design—the shape and appearance of food—trade
secret protection is unlikely to be available. Food design presents a
formidable challenge to trade secret protection: once the food is displayed
and distributed to consumers, its design is no longer secret.17 However,
under trade secret law, certain recipes, formulas, and manufacturing and
7

See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005)
[hereinafter UTSA].
8
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (AM. L. INST. 1995)
[hereinafter Restatement].
9
See Michael R. McGurk & Jia W. Lu, The Intersection of Patents and Trade
Secrets, 7 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L. J. 189, 191 (2015).
10
See Restatement § 39 cmt. d. In addition, a trade secret can be “negative”
information or know-how that results from research blind alleys, failed designs,
and methods that do not work. Id. at cmt. e. The information need not be novel,
in continuous use, or exist in a tangible form to be protected. Id. at cmt. f.
11
UTSA § 1(4)(i).
12
Id. § 1(4)(ii).
13
Id. § 1(2).
14
Id. § 1(1).
15
“Reverse engineering is the process by which an engineer takes an already
existing product and works backward to re-create its design and/or manufacturing
process.” United Techs. Corp. v. FAA, 102 F.3d 688, 690 n.1 (2d Cir. 1996).
16
See Kurt M. Saunders & Nina Golden, Skill or Secret? — The Line Between
Trade Secrets and Employee General Skill and Knowledge, 15 N.Y.U. J. L. &
BUS. 61, 75 (2018).
17
Of course, the process or procedure for creating the food design could be a trade
secret if it was maintained in secrecy and not readily ascertainable by others in
the industry. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
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preparation processes may be protected. Some of the more well-known
protected formulas and recipes are the original recipe for Kentucky Fried
Chicken, the recipes for Twinkies and Krispy Kreme donuts, and, for a
time, McDonald’s special sauce.18 When recipes have not qualified for
trade secret protection, an often-cited reason is their lack of economic
value in the trade secret sense. Basic cooking and food preparation
methods and concepts are ineligible for trade secret protection because
they are already known or too easily discoverable to derive value from
secrecy. In Buffets, Inc. v. Klinke,19 for instance, the court held that the
plaintiff could not claim trade secret protection for recipes for buffet
cuisine, such as barbecued chicken and macaroni and cheese, because they
were American staples and generally known.20 By contrast, the court in
Peggy Lawton Kitchens, Inc. v. Hogan21 found that a carefully guarded
recipe for nut meal infused chocolate chip cookies had economic value
because the cookies had an original and distinctive flavor and had been a
commercial success.22
Also critical to successfully maintaining a recipe as a trade secret
is a requirement that the owner takes reasonable steps to maintain its
secrecy. Here, absolute secrecy is not required, and the reasonableness of
the measures taken to maintain secrecy depends on the particular
circumstances of the business, including the nature of the product or
service, the state of the art in the trade or industry, and the level of risk of
disclosure.23 For instance, many chefs rely on nondisclosure agreements
to preserve the secrecy of their recipes.24 The case of Magistro v. J. Lou,
Inc.25 involved recipes for pizza dough and tomato sauce used in a family
restaurant business. Only family members created and prepared the
recipes and no one outside the family knew the recipes. The owners
protected the family recipes by putting the ingredients into packets that
were sealed and refrigerated until needed, and an employee would add
water to make the sauce and the dough.26 Based on these efforts, the court
concluded that the recipes derived independent economic value from not

18

See Babak Zarin, Knead to Know: Cracking Recipes and Trade Secret Law, 8
ELON L. REV. 183, 192 (2016).
19
73 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 1996).
20
See id. at 968–69. See also Li v. Shuman, No. 5:14-cv-00030, 2016 WL
7217855, at *20 (W.D. Va. 2016) (holding that recipes for common Asian dishes
are generally known); Little Caesar Enters., Inc. v. Sioux Falls Pizza Co., No.
CIV. 12-4111-KES, 2012 WL 3190788, at *3 (D.S.D. 2012) (holding that systems
for making ready-to-pick-up pizzas are generally known and lack economic
value); Vraiment Hosp., LLC v. Binkowski, No. 8:11–CV–1240–T–33TGW,
2021 WL 1493737, at *14 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (holding that a recipe for salted
caramel brownies is not secret because it can be found on the internet).
21
466 N.E.2d 138 (Mass. Ct. App. 1984).
22
See id. at 140.
23
See Saunders & Golden, supra note 16, at 73.
24
See Emily Cunningham, Protecting Cuisine Under the Rubric of Intellectual
Property Law: Should the Law Play a Bigger Role in the Kitchen, 9 J. HIGH TECH.
L. 21, 49–50 (2009).
25
703 N.W.2d 887 (Neb. 2005).
26
See id. at 890–91.
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being known to other persons and that the owners made reasonable efforts
under the circumstances to maintain their secrecy.27
Even when one can establish that a recipe is a trade secret, a claim
of misappropriation depends on proof that the defendant either acquired
the recipe through improper means or used or disclosed it without
consent.28 In Magistro, even though the court agreed that recipes were
protectable trade secrets, the plaintiffs failed to prove that the defendant
was using their trade secrets, so their claim failed.29 By contrast, in Bimbo
Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella,30 the owner of the recipe for Thomas’
English Muffins, including the secret behind the muffins’ unique “nooks
and crannies” texture, prevailed in obtaining a preliminary injunction
based on threatened misappropriation against a former senior executive
who had accepted a similar position working for a competitor.31
According to the court in Botticella, there was sufficient evidence that the
former employee intended to use the trade secret because he had not
disclosed his acceptance of a job offer from a direct competitor, remained
in a position to receive confidential information after committing to the
other job, and copied trade secret information from his work laptop onto
external storage devices.32
As these cases demonstrate, it is imperative that a recipe is not
merely kept confidential, but that its value is derived from its uniqueness
within the industry. Finally, owners of trade secrets in recipes must
remember that they are not protected from reverse engineering of the
recipes by others, nor can they assert their trade secret rights against others
who independently develop the same or similar recipes. A claim for relief
must be based on evidence of actual or threatened misappropriation of the
trade secret at issue.33 Nevertheless, due to its potentially unlimited
duration and informality by which it can be established, trade secrecy
remains an attractive form of protection for recipes.34

27

Id. at 891.
See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
29
See Magistro, 703 N.W.2d at 892.
30
613 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 2010).
31
Id. at 119.
32
Id. at 118. See also Revzip, LLC v. McDonnell, No. 3:19-cv-191, 2020 WL
1929523, at *8–9 (W.D. Pa. 2020) (requiring employees to sign confidentiality
agreements, disclosing the recipes for sandwich dressing only on a need-to-know
basis, and protecting the recipes with electronic security were reasonable secrecy
measures); Uncle B’s Bakery, Inc. v. O’Rourke, 920 F. Supp. 1405 (N.D. Iowa
1996) (injunction against former employee to protect bagel air tight packaging
process); Christopher M’s Hand Poured Fudge, Inc. v. Hennon, 699 A.2d 1272
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (injunction against former employee to protect secret recipe
and manufacturing process).
33
See UTSA §§ 2, 3.
34
For a more detailed discussion of the advantages of trade secret protection for
recipes, see Babak, supra note 18.
28
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B. Copyrights
Copyright protection affords “a set of exclusive rights granted to
authors as to the ownership and use of their creative works.” 35 The work
of authorship must be original and fixed in a tangible medium to qualify
for protection, like being recorded or preserved in some steady, physical
form.36 The Copyright Act provides that the fixation requirement has been
met “when its embodiment . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit
it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of
more than transitory duration.”37 Originality requires that the work’s
origin is the author, who has not copied it from another source.38
Moreover, the work must demonstrate “some minimal degree of
creativity.”39
According to the Copyright Act, copyright protection extends
only to the original and fixed expression embodied in works of authorship,
including (1) literary works; (2) musical works; (3) dramatic works; (4)
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and audiovisual works; (7) sound
recordings; and (8) architectural designs.40 Computer software can be
protected as well.41 A compilation of facts or data is protected to the extent
that there is originality in selecting, coordinating, or arranging the
elements.42 However, ideas, discoveries, principles, methods, procedures,
and useful articles are not eligible for copyright protection.43 Only
expression is protected, but the merger doctrine dictates that the expression
is uncopyrightable when there is only one way to express the idea or fact.44
Copyright protection for a work of authorship vests the moment
an original work is fixed, regardless of whether it is ever published.
Although not required, the copyright owner may register the copyright

35

KURT M. SAUNDERS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: LEGAL ASPECTS OF
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 259 (2016).
36
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). A work is “fixed” when embodied
in a copy or phonorecord, both of which are defined in the Copyright Act as a
material object. See id. § 101. The embodied work must be stable rather than
temporary or transient to be fixed. See, e.g., Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d
290, 303 (7th Cir. 2011) (reasoning “that a living garden lacks the kind of
authorship and stable fixation normally required to support copyright”); Stern
Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982) (explaining that a video
game satisfies fixation because of “[t]he repetitive sequence of a substantial
portion of the sights and sounds of the game”).
37
17 U.S.C. § 101.
38
See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
39
Id.
40
17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
41
See Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 702 (2d Cir. 1992).
42
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
43
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1990).
44
See Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458 (5th Cir.
1990) (holding that maps of pipeline locations are not copyrightable); Morrissey
v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 673 (1st Cir. 1967) (holding that subject matter
of contest rules is not copyrightable).
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with the U.S. Copyright Office.45 The term of copyright protection for
most works is the author’s lifetime, plus seventy years.46 Copyright
owners have the exclusive rights to reproduce their works, adapt their
works to create derivative works, publicly distribute them, and publicly
perform and display their works.47 In addition, the copyright owner may
transfer by license or assignment any or all of these rights to another. 48
Any person who exercises any of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights
without authorization may be liable for copyright infringement.49
As applied to recipes, copyright law affords little protection. At
the risk of making cooking sound like a mechanical operation, courts have
viewed recipes as processes or procedures for creating or assembling a
particular dish. As section 102(b) provides, “[i]n no case does copyright
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any . . . procedure
[or] process . . . .”50 In other words, most recipes do not constitute original
expression. The court in Publications International, Ltd. v. Meredith
Corp.51 explained that “the content of recipes are clearly dictated by
functional considerations, and . . . lack the required element of
originality.”52 That case involved a cookbook compilation of recipes made
with yogurt, which the court viewed as functional lists of ingredients and
directions on how to combine them.53 Similarly, in Lambing v. Godiva
Chocolatier,54 the court held that a recipe for a chocolate truffle was not
copyrightable since it was a mere statement of facts and lacking in any
expressive content.55 One might view the lack of originality in recipes as
a merger of idea, fact, and expression since the nature of the dish dictates
the listing of ingredients and the directions for preparation.56 As the court
in Sassafras Enterprises, Inc. v. Roshco, Inc.57 explained, recipes are
ineligible for copyright protection because they “dictate themselves and
flow from the characteristics and intended use of the product, not from the
imagination of any independent author.”58
45

17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2005). Registration creates a presumption of ownership of
a valid copyright. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 157 (1976), reprinted in 17
U.S.C. § 410 (1976).
46
See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1998).
47
See id. § 106 (2002).
48
See id. § 201(d) (1978).
49
See id. § 501(a) (2019).
50
Id. § 102(b) (1990) (internal punctuation omitted).
51
88 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996).
52
Id. at 481 (quoting MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 2.18[l], at 2-204.25 to .26 (May 1996)). Accord Harrell v. St. John,
792 F. Supp. 2d 933 (S.D. Miss. 2011).
53
Publ’ns Int’l, 88 F.3d at 480.
54
142 F.3d 434 (6th Cir. 1998).
55
Id. at 434.
56
See Lorenzana v. S. Am. Rests. Corp., 799 F.3d 31, 34 (1st Cir. 2015) (holding
that a recipe as a combination of ingredients for making a sandwich not
copyrightable); Lapine v. Seinfeld, 375 Fed. Appx. 81, 83 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding
that the underlying idea of recipes containing vegetable purees for hidden use in
children’s food is not copyrightable).
57
889 F. Supp. 343 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
58
Id. at 347.
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On the other hand, recipes containing other original expression,
such as commentary or artistic elements, could qualify for protection. In
Barbour v. Head,59 for instance, the court distinguished between rote
recitations of ingredients and instructions to find copyrightable expression
in the “light-hearted or helpful commentary” that accompanied the recipes
in a Texas-themed cookbook.60 This echoes the court’s statement in
Publications International that recipes warranting protection may be those
where the recipe includes expressive content such as “suggestions for
presentation, advice on wines to go with the meal, or hints on place settings
with appropriate music,” or where the recipes are accompanied by “tales
of their historical or ethnic origin.”61 Other courts have found similar
expression warranting protection to include the use of pictures and
illustrations, quotations and poems, handwritten script, and similar artistic
and graphic elements.62 Nevertheless, others would be free to explain or
illustrate a recipe using dissimilar expressions.
Although most recipes themselves may garner no copyright
protection, a compilation of recipes may be protected if their selection,
coordination, and arrangement are original.63 For instance, in TomaydoTomahhdo, LLC v. Vozary,64 the plaintiffs asserted copyright protection
for a book of recipes for family-friendly foods based on its restaurant
menu. After observing that the recipes themselves did not merit copyright
protection because they were factual statements and functional directions,
the court reasoned that protection might extend to a book of recipes to the
degree that the compilation demonstrates originality in selecting or
arranging of the recipes.65 However, the court found that the compilation
of family-friendly recipes was not original because the plaintiffs never
identified what was original and creative in the process of selecting and
arranging them.66
Courts have noted that food and specifically food designs, are
typically ineligible for copyright protection because they do not satisfy the
Copyright Act’s requirement that the work be fixed in a tangible
medium.67 In Kim Seng Co. v. J & A Importers, Inc.,68 the plaintiff claimed
59

178 F. Supp. 2d 758 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
Id. at 764.
61
Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 481 (7th Cir. 1996).
62
See, e.g., Branch v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., No. 89 CIV. 2440 LLS, 1990 WL
74540 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
63
Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines a “compilation” as “a work formed
by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are
selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole
constitutes an original work of authorship.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
64
629 F. App’x. 658 (6th Cir. 2015).
65
Id. at 661.
66
Id. One court has found that the lack of originality problem can extend to
photographs of cooked food dishes as well. See Oriental Art Printing, Inc. v.
Goldstar Printing Corp., 175 F. Supp. 2d 542, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that
photos of common Chinese dishes as they appear on plates served to customers
were insufficiently original for copyright protection).
67
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
68
810 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
60
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copyright protection for a food sculpture of a traditional Vietnamese
dish.69 The court, however, found that the sculpture failed to satisfy the
fixation requirement of the Copyright Act.70 Relying on Kelley v. Chicago
Park District,71 the court found that a bowl of perishable food similarly
did not satisfy the fixation requirement because it was not sufficiently
stable or permanent.72
Furthermore, the court in Kim Seng reasoned that the combination
of unprotectable elements in a display of traditional Vietnamese cuisine
lacked originality and were inseparable from their underlying utilitarian
purpose, which is to be consumed.73 This issue is directly related to
copyright protection of the design of any three-dimensional work of useful
or applied art. Copyright protection extends to applied art “only if, and
only to the extent that, such design incorporates . . . sculptural features that
can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”74 As such, any
artistic or aesthetic elements of a dish would have to be identified
separately from the food and exist independent of the utilitarian purpose
of consuming the food. It is difficult to imagine that many food sculptures
or designs could meet this requirement unless they were created for the
purpose of not being eaten.75
In sum, the limitations and restrictions of copyright law make it
an impractical fit for recipes and food designs. Basic recipes alone are not
copyrightable unless the recipes contain a sufficient number of other
original expressions beyond and unrelated to the listing of ingredients and
the procedure for combining them.
Likewise, recipes are also
unprotectable unless protection is sought for a compilation of recipes that
reflect a requisite measure of originality in selecting and arranging those
recipes.76 As for food displays, designs, and sculptures, the primary

69

Id. at 1051.
Id. at 1054.
71
635 F.3d 290, 303 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that an artistically arranged living
garden was not stable or permanent enough to be a work of fixed authorship).
72
Kim Seng Co., 810 F. Supp. 2d at 1054. For the same reason, tattoos and facial
make-up designs are not fixed on human skin, although courts have ruled that
such works can be fixed if recorded on paper or in photographs. See Mourabit v.
Klein, 816 F. Appx. 574 (2d Cir. 2020) (make-up artistry); Solid Oak Sketches,
LLC v. 2K Games, Inc., No. 16-CV-724-LTS-SDA, 2018 WL 1626145 (S.D.N.Y.
2018) (tattoos). However, infringement would be difficult to prove if the tattoo
or make-up appeared on a person’s skin since it would not itself be a copy. See
Saunders, supra note 35, at 270 (“The unauthorized copy must be fixed in a
material object . . . .”).
73
Kim Seng Co., 810 F. Supp. 2d at 1053.
74
17 U.S.C. § 101.
75
More than one commentator has proposed expanding the Copyright Act’s
protection for moral rights in works of visual art to encompass protection for
“food art.” See Caroline M. Reebs, Extending Copyright Protection to Food Art,
22 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 41 (2011); Cathay Y. Smith, Food
Art: Protecting “Food Presentation” Under U.S. Intellectual Property Law, 14 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (2014).
76
See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text.
70
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roadblock to protection is that they cannot meet the fixation requirement77
for copyrightability and suffer from the secondary barrier of being
ultimately inseparable from their underlying utilitarian purpose as edible
food.78

C. Utility and Design Patents
A patent is a right granted by the United States, which allows an
inventor to exclude others from practicing the invention during the patent
term.79 In other words, patents protect inventions.80 The purpose of patent
law is to promote the progress of the useful arts by disclosing inventions
in exchange for a limited term of protection. 81 The two main types of
patents are utility patents and design patents.
1. Utility Patent Protection
A utility patent can be granted on a “process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter or any new and useful improvement
thereof.”82 A recipe typically describes a list of ingredients, instructions
on combining and cooking them, and the resulting food product or dish.
Since a recipe consists of a list of ingredients and instructions, a recipe can
be considered a process and a food product or dish as a composition of
matter or a manufacture. To obtain a patent, a party must apply to the U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office, where it is subject to a detailed examination
process to determine whether the claimed invention satisfies the
requirements for patentability.83 If granted, the term of protection for a
utility patent is twenty years from the date the application was filed.84 A
patent owner has the right to exclude others from making, using, selling,
or offering to sell, and importing the invention in the United States.85
An invention must be useful, novel, and nonobvious to qualify for
patent protection.86 An invention is useful only if it has a practical
application or serves a specific benefit.87 In the case of recipes or food
products, the utility requirement would be met if the invention is a process
for preparing edible food or if the product itself was an article or
combination of ingredients that could be consumed.88 Novelty is
demonstrated if the claimed invention has never before been publicly
disclosed through use, sale, patenting, or publication anywhere in the

77

See supra notes 67–72 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text.
79
See Saunders, supra note 35, at 97.
80
See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (providing that inventors may obtain patents).
81
See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).
82
35 U.S.C. § 101.
83
For an explanation of the patent application and examination process, see AMY
L. LANDERS, UNDERSTANDING PATENT LAW 19–56 (2d ed. 2012).
84
See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
85
Id. § 271(a).
86
Id. §§ 101, 102(a), 103.
87
See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966).
88
See Morgan P. Arons, A Chef’s Guide to Patent Protections Available for
Cooking Techniques and Recipes in the Era of Postmodern Cuisine and
Molecular Gastronomy, 10 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 137, 141 (2015).
78
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world before the date on which the patent application was filed. 89 There
is an exception if the inventor has publicly disclosed the invention, as long
as the inventor files an application within one year after the date of the
disclosure.90
Novelty is a technical and precise requirement. To disqualify a
patent application for lack of novelty, the preceding disclosure must
involve a single prior art source or reference that disclosed an identical
invention to that claimed in the application.91 The prior disclosure must
be enabling, so that those who are knowledgeable in the field can
understand it,92 and it must be publicly accessible so as to be located.93 In
the context of food, this means that the recipe or food product must be new
in the sense that it represents a previously unknown combination of
ingredients or variation on a known recipe.94 In Proctor & Gamble Co. v.
Nabisco Brands,95 Proctor & Gamble had secured a patent for a recipe and
process for making a dual-textured cookie—crispy on the outside and
chewy on the inside—by baking and tempering the laminated dough
structure.96 When the defendants began marketing their own dual-textured
cookies, Proctor & Gamble sued for infringement, and the defendants
argued that the patent was invalid and unenforceable based on a cookie
recipe published in an earlier cookbook. After examining each element of
the claimed invention, the court determined that the recipe and process
were invalid as anticipated by the earlier recipe found in the printed
publication.97
In addition to being novel, the invention must be nonobvious.
Because novelty and nonobviousness are distinct requirements, even if a
recipe or food product is novel, the recipe or food product could still be
considered obvious and unpatentable. An invention is nonobvious when
those of ordinary skill in the field and familiar with the existing technology
would not have easily conceived it.98 In other words, if the differences
between the invention and prior art are such that make the invention
obvious at the time it was made to persons with ordinary skill in the art,

89

See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1).
Id. § 102(b).
91
See Saunders, supra note 35, at 124.
92
Impax Lab’ys, Inc. v. Aventis Pharms. Inc., 468 F.3d 1366, 1383 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (“In order to be anticipating, a prior art reference must be enabling so that
the claimed subject matter may be made or used by one skilled in the art.”).
93
See Jazz Pharms., Inc. v. Amneal Pharms., LLC, 895 F.3d 1347, 1355–56 (Fed.
Cir. 2018) (“A reference is considered publicly accessible ‘upon a satisfactory
showing that such document has been disseminated or otherwise made available
to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or
art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.’” (quoting In re Wyer, 655 F.2d
221, 226 (C.C.P.A. 1981)).
94
See Arons, supra note 88, at 141.
95
711 F. Supp. 759 (D. Del. 1989).
96
Id. at 760.
97
Id. at 773.
98
See 35 U.S.C. § 103.
90
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then it is not patentable.99 Thus, the key to assessing nonobviousness is to
compare the invention as a whole with the references in the prior art.100 If
an objective person skilled in the art would have found the claimed
invention to be an obvious next step beyond the current field of
technology, then the invention is obvious.101 If the combination,
preparation, or variations of known ingredients leads to expected results
or flavors because the ingredients react in well-understood ways, the
product is likely to be considered obvious to a person having ordinary
culinary arts skills.102
The utility patent at issue in Ex parte Kretchman103 illustrates
these points. An invention relating to a crustless peanut butter and jelly
sandwich was the issue at the heart of Kretchman.104 The patent
application described an arrangement of the jelly layer in the center so that
it is surrounded by the peanut butter layers and crimped at the edges to
prevent the jelly from leaking out.105 When the patent examiner rejected
the application because the patent was invalid due to obviousness,
Smucker appealed.106 The prior art references included a book of recipes
describing a device for creating a crustless sandwich.107 Another prior art
reference was a newspaper article that recommended applying peanut
butter to both pieces of bread before the jelly to prevent the bread from
becoming soggy.108 Based on these references, the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences109 ruled that the patent was invalid because
those of ordinary skill in the field would consider the Smucker invention
obvious.110

99

Unlike lack of novelty due to any single source of prior art that discloses the
same invention, a finding of obviousness may be based on a combination of prior
art sources that deal with the same problem or together suggest the same solution
to the problem. See In re Nylen, 97 Fed. Appx. 293 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Clay,
966 F.2d 656 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
100
See Landers, supra note 83, at 365.
101
See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 399 (2007); Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
102
See Arons, supra note 88, at 145.
103
No. 2003-1754, 2003 WL 23507730 (B.P.A.I. Dec. 10, 2003).
104
Id. at *1.
105
Id. at *2.
106
Id.
107
Id. at *2–3.
108
Id.
109
This board is now known as the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. It conducts
trials, including inter partes, post-grant, and covered business method patent
reviews and derivation proceedings. It also hears appeals from adverse examiner
decisions in patent applications and reexamination proceedings, and renders
decisions in interferences. See generally Patent Trial and Appeal Board, U.S.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab (last visited Apr.
2, 2021).
110
See Kretchman, at *6–7. Specifically, the Board explained that based on the
two prior art references, “one of ordinary skill in the art . . . would [understand] .
. . that the peanut butter should be applied in a manner so as to encapsulate the
jelly, that is, the jelly layer would be made smaller in area so that it does not
contact the bread.” Id. at *7.
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Despite the apparent difficulties in securing utility patents, utility
patents have been granted for recipes and food products. Examples
include: a recipe for instant stuffing mix, 111 a method for making a
microwaveable sponge cake,112 burrito on a stick,113 cereal coated with dry
milk,114 a process for making fruit ganache,115 yogurt cream cheese,116
microwaveable sponge cake,117 sugarless baked goods,118 an egg
substitute,119 processes for making fried baked potato pieces,120 low-fat
potato chips,121 frozen popsicles,122 and battered foods.123 While it is often
difficult to meet the requirements for obtaining a utility patent, it offers
one of the most robust forms of intellectual property protection allowing
the patentee to exclude all others from using the recipe, or making, selling,
or importing the food product.124 However, it must be kept in mind that
the length of protection is finite—expiring after twenty years—thus
allowing the recipes or food product to become part of the public domain
at that time.125
2. Design Patent Protection
While utility patents protect how an article works and is used,
design patents protect how an article looks. A design patent protects new,
original, and ornamental designs for articles of manufacture.126 An article
of manufacture is a product that results from a manufacturing process.127
The design consists of the visual ornamental characteristics embodied in
or applied to an article of manufacture.128 Design patents have been issued
for a broad assortment of products—including furniture, tools,
automobiles, water fountains, vending machines, microwave ovens, tire

111

U.S. Patent No. 3,870,803 (filed Jul. 7, 1971).
U.S. Patent No. 6,410,074B1 (filed Oct. 4, 2000).
113
U.S. Patent No. 4,399,156 (filed Jan. 25, 1982).
114
U.S. Patent No. 6,051,262 (filed July 27, 1998).
115
U.S. Patent No. 5,958,503 (filed Feb. 21, 1997).
116
U.S. Patent No. 7,258,886 (filed Mar. 18, 2005).
117
U.S. Patent No. 6,410,074 (filed Feb. 9, 2001).
118
U.S. Patent No. 5,700,511A (filed Mar. 1, 1996).
119
U.S. Patent No. 4,120,986 (filed June 28, 1977).
120
U.S. Patent No. 8,329,244 (filed July 15, 2011).
121
U.S. Patent No. 8,163,321 (filed Oct. 31, 2007).
122
Popsicle Corp. v. Weiss, 40 F.2d 301, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
123
U.S. Patent No. 6,117,463 (filed Nov. 25, 1998).
124
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
125
See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
126
35 U.S.C. § 171.
127
See Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 435 (2016) (observing
that “[a]n article of manufacture, then, is simply a thing made by hand or
machine”).
128
See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1502 (9th ed. Rev.
10.2019, June 2020) [hereinafter MPEP] (reviewing case law that defines the
subject matter of design patents).
112

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

172

tread, and computer screen icons.129 The term of a design patent is limited
to 15 years from the date the patent is granted.130
As to the requirements for design patent protection, originality
requires that the design originate with the applicant.131 A design is novel
if no prior art reference publicly discloses the identical design before the
application was filed.132 In addition, the design must be nonobvious. A
design is nonobvious if a designer of ordinary skill who designs articles of
the same type would consider differences in the visual appearance of the
design and those from the prior art not to be obvious.133 Furthermore, the
design must be ornamental and nonfunctional.134 If its function dictated
the entire appearance of the article, then the design is not ornamental.135
If a particular design is essential to the use of an article because it is
dictated by the use or purpose of the article or enhances the article’s
performance, then the design is functional.136

129

E.g., U.S. Patent No. D485,709 (filed Apr. 16, 2003) (furniture); U.S. Patent
No. D772,671 (filed June 24, 2015) (hammer); U.S. Patent No. D732,431 (filed
Aug. 15, 2014) (motor car); Application of Hruby, 373 F.2d 997 (C.C.P.A. 1967)
(water fountain); Unidynamics Corp. v. Automatic Prods. Int’l, Ltd., 157 F.3d
1311 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (vending machine); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp.,
728 F.2d 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (microwave oven); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
v. Hercules Tire & Rubber Co., 162 F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (tire tread); U.S.
Patent No. D668,263 (filed Oct. 8, 2010) (computer icon).
130
35 U.S.C. § 173. Design patents usually contain a single claim comprised of
a drawing, unlike a utility patent, which contains multiple textual claims. Design
patent claims are limited to what is shown in the application drawings. See MPEP
§ 1503.02. As with utility patents, a design patent must disclose the claimed
design with definiteness as assessed by an ordinary observer. See In re Maatita,
900 F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
131
See Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1238 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (suggesting that the originality requirement for design patents, like that
for copyright, requires that the design have originated with the creator).
132
35 U.S.C. § 102(a). However, such a disclosure will not be treated as prior art
if the design was publicly disclosed by the applicant one year or less before filing
a patent application. Id. § 102(b).
133
See Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., 101 F.3d 100, 103 (Fed. Cir. 1996). In
determining nonobviousness, the patent examiner considers whether a prior art
reference or a combination of references shares design characteristics that are
basically the same as the visual impression created by the claimed design. If a
designer of ordinary skill would be likely to believe this, then the claimed design
is obvious and not patentable. See MPEP § 1504.03.
134
35 U.S.C. § 171.
135
See Avia Group Int’l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (noting that the analysis of ornamentality is holistic, focusing on the overall
appearance of the claimed design rather than the appearance of the article itself).
Courts may consider the availability of alternative designs for the article as an
important and persuasive factor in evaluating the functionality of a claimed
design. Id.
136
See Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Auto.
Body Parts Ass’n v. Ford Global Techs., LLC, 930 F.3d 1314, 1320–21 (Fed. Cir.
2019) (explaining that “Best Lock turned on the admitted fact that no alternatively
designed blade would mechanically operate the lock—not that the blade and lock
were aesthetically compatible”). Of course, since some articles of manufacture
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A number of food designs have been granted design patents:
dinosaur-shaped crackers,137 a cheesecake with embedded swirl,138 a
teddy-bear-shaped sugar confection,139 stuffed pizza pockets,140 a deep
dish pizza slice,141 heart-shaped candy canes,142 waffles,143 chocolate
bars,144 and embossed bread,145 among others. In addition, many patented
designs apply to well-known branded products, including: Mars Candy
bars,146 Breyer’s Viennetta frozen desserts,147 Wrigley’s Eclipse gum,148
Coldstone Creamery’s Strawberry Passion ice cream cake,149 Morton salt
blocks,150 numerous Kraft pastas,151 and Frito Lay snack food products.152
As with utility patents, a design patent confers the right to exclude
others from making, using, selling, importing, and offering to sell certain
products bearing the same or substantially similar appearance to the
patented design.153 Proving infringement of a design patent requires that
the accused design be identical or substantially the same as the patented
design.154 This determination is made from the standpoint of the ordinary
observer.155 Under this test, infringement occurs when—in the view of an
ordinary observer familiar with prior art design—the similarities are
substantially the same so that the ordinary observer would believe that the
allegedly infringing design is the same as the overall patented design.156
may possess both functional and ornamental characteristics, they may be
protected by both utility and design patents.
137
U.S. Patent No. D782,777 (filed May 9, 2016).
138
U.S. Patent No. D762,342 (filed Dec. 18. 2014).
139
U.S. Patent No. D788,400 (filed Jun. 30, 2016).
140
U.S. Patent No. D784,650 (filed Mar. 19, 2015).
141
U.S. Patent No. D783,225 (filed Apr. 9, 2015).
142
U.S. Patent No. D785,900 (filed Sep. 24, 2009).
143
U.S. Patent No. D373,452 (filed Sep. 20, 1995).
144
U.S. Patent No. D788,401 (filed Nov. 5, 2012).
145
U.S. Patent No. D790,154 (filed Jan. 14, 2016).
146
U.S. Patent No. D593,276 (filed Jul. 10, 2008).
147
U.S. Patent No. D486,951 (filed Nov. 18, 2002).
148
U.S. Patent No. D539,007 (filed Sep. 5, 2003).
149
U.S. Patent No. D571,526 (filed Jun. 23, 2004).
150
U.S. Patent No. D848,107 (filed Apr. 11, 2017).
151
E.g., U.S. Patent No. D525,411 (filed May 31, 2005) (map of United States);
U.S. Patent No. D517,772 (filed May 31, 2005) (dinosaur shape); U.S. Patent No.
D515,272 (filed Aug. 28. 2003) (magic wand shape).
152
E.g., U.S. Patent No. D789,027S (issued Jun. 13, 2017); U.S. Patent No.
D787,152S (issued May 23, 2017); U.S. Patent No. D787,151S (issued May 23,
2017); U.S. Patent No. D786,526S (issued May 16, 2017); U.S. Patent No.
D785,280S (issued May 2, 2017); U.S. Patent No. D785,278S (issued May 2,
2017); U.S. Patent No. D783,928S (issued Apr. 18, 2017); U.S. Patent No.
D779,777S (issued Feb. 28, 2017).
153
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
154
Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 528 (1871).
155
The ordinary observer is the person who regularly purchases such items. See
Arminak & Assocs., Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Calmar, Inc., 501 F.3d 1314, 1320 (Fed.
Cir. 2007); Arc’Teryx Equip., Inc. v. Westcomb Outerwear, Inc., No. 2:07-CV59 TS, 2008 WL 4838141, at *2 (D. Utah Nov. 4, 2008).
156
See Gorham, 81 U.S. at 528 (observing that infringement occurs only if the
ordinary observer would mistake one product for the other). An “ordinary
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The focus is on similarities with the overall patented design, not on
similarities of individual elements.
In Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc.,157 the court applied the
ordinary observer test. Egyptian Goddess owned a design patent on a
rectangular, hollow nail buffer.158 Egyptian Goddess sued Swisa Inc.,
alleging that a Swisa fingernail buffer infringed the patent.159 Swisa
moved for a summary judgment of noninfringement.160 The district court
granted Swisa’s motion and Egyptian Goddess appealed.161 The Federal
Circuit held that the district court correctly granted summary judgment of
noninfringement.162 According to the court, under the ordinary observer
test, infringement will not be found unless the accused design “embodies
the patented design or any colorable imitation thereof.”163 The allegedly
infringing Swisa design could not reasonably be viewed as so similar to
the claimed Egyptian Goddess design that an ordinary observer familiar
with the prior art would be deceived by the similarity between the claimed
and accused designs.164
Design patent infringement cases involving food-related products
are rare, but Contessa Food Products, Inc. v. Conagra, Inc.,165 provides
one example. The owner of a design patent for shrimp serving trays
brought an action against a competitor selling allegedly infringing trays.166
The patent covered a circular serving tray with a center receptacle for
cocktail sauce to facilitate a circular arrangement of concentric rows of
shrimp aligned together in a mound. 167 The defendant sold a similar
shrimp platter.168 In applying the ordinary observer test, the court of
appeals held that the “ordinary observer” analysis is not limited to those
features visible at the point of sale, but instead must encompass all
ornamental features visible at any time during normal use of the product.169
As such, the district court had erred in failing to consider the underside of
the serving tray as well as the visible portion to assess substantial

observer” is “someone who—while not an expert in the product—is not entirely
ignorant of it, and indeed has some degree of familiarity with it. The ‘ordinary
observer’ thus includes someone who has purchased, or shopped for, a like item
in the past.” Hutzler Mfg. Co. v. Bradshaw Int’l, Inc., No. 11 CIV. 7211 PGG,
2012 WL 3031150, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 25, 2012).
157
543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
158
Id. at 668.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id. at 669.
162
Id. at 670.
163
Id. at 678.
164
Id. at 682–83. Note also that the defense of patent exhaustion and the related
repair and reconstruction doctrine apply to design patents. See Automotive Body
Parts Ass’n v. Ford Global Techs., LLC, 930 F.3d 1314, 1322–25 (Fed. Cir.
2019).
165
282 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
166
Id. at 1376.
167
U.S. Patent No. D404,612 (issued Jan. 26, 1999).
168
Contessa Food Prods., 282 F.3d at 1375.
169
Id. at 1379–81.
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similarity.170 The importance of focusing on the overall ornamental
appearance, particularly with simple and inexpensive designs, was
underscored in a subsequent infringement case involving garlic and onion
storage containers.171

D. Trademarks and Trade Dress
Trademarks identify and distinguish the source of goods or
services,172 and generally take the form of a word, phrase, symbol, design,
or some combination of these.173 Trademarks can also be scents, sounds,
and colors.174 Trade dress is a type of trademark that refers to the overall
appearance of a product or its packaging.175 Trade dress consists of “the
total image and overall appearance” of a product and “may include
features such as size, shape, color or color combinations, textures,
graphics, or even particular sales techniques.”176
Trademark rights are intended to protect against potential
consumer confusion as to the source of a particular product,177 and may be
protected under state common law of unfair competition, state trademark
statutes,178 and the federal Lanham Act.179 To obtain trademark protection,
170

Id. at 1381.
See Hutzler Mfg. Co., 2012 WL 3031150, at *14–15. Another case involved
an infringement claim based on a design patent for a peace sign-shaped pretzel.
See U.S. Patent No. D423184 (issued Apr. 25, 2000). The plaintiff alleged that
the defendants were selling similarly shaped pretzel chips, but the case eventually
settled. See Complaint at 3–4, Friend v. Keystone Pretzels, No. 2:13-cv-01028DSC (W.D. Pa. Jul. 17, 2013), 2013 WL3878103.
172
See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018); see also Restatement § 9 (1995) (“A trademark
is a word . . . that is used in a manner that identifies those goods or services and
distinguishes them from the goods or services of others.”).
173
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051(a)(3), 1127.
174
Scents that have been trademarked include floral fragrances for sewing thread,
In re Clark, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1238 (T.T.A.B. 1990), and Play-Doh scent (U.S. Reg.
No. 5,467,089, May 15, 2018). Trademarked sounds include the NBC chimes
(U.S. Reg. No. 916,522, Jul. 13, 1971), MGM’s roaring lion (U.S. Reg. No.
1,395,550, Jun. 3, 1986), and the Tarzan yell (U.S. Reg. No. 2,210,506, Dec. 15,
1998). In Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995), the
Supreme Court held that a color (in this case green gold dry cleaning pads) could
be trademarked as long as it had acquired secondary meaning. Tiffany blue is
also a registered trademark (U.S. Registration No. 2,359,351, June 20, 2000).
175
See Saunders, supra note 35, at 534.
176
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 764 n.1 (1992).
177
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (recognizing a cause of action for the use by any person
of “any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof . . .
which . . . is likely to cause confusion . . . as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval
of his or her goods . . . .”).
178
For an overview and discussion of the role of state trademark law, see John T.
Cross, The Role of the States in United States Trademark Law, 49 U. LOUISVILLE
L. REV. 485 (2011).
179
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1128. The Lanham Act was enacted in 1946 out of concern
that leaving trademark protection to the states would create inconsistency and
uncertainty in the law and in order to provide national protection for trademarks
used in interstate and foreign commerce. S. REP. NO. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
5 (1946).
171
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users must be the first to use it in trade and must use it continuously
thereafter.180 The Lanham Act permits the owner of a trademark to
federally register the mark if it is (1) distinctive and (2) used in interstate
or international commerce.181 Federal registration lasts for ten years and
may be renewed for additional ten-year periods as long as the mark
remains in commercial use.182 While federal registration provides a
trademark owner with additional protections and remedies,183 an
unregistered trademark is entitled to protection under the Lanham Act if it
satisfies the requirements for federal registration.184
1. Protectable Trademarks and Trade Dress
Different types of marks—inherently distinctive marks,
descriptive marks, and generic marks—receive different levels of
protection. A mark that is considered inherently distinctive receives the
most protection.185 Inherently distinctive marks can be fanciful, arbitrary,
or suggestive.186 A fanciful mark is one consisting of a made-up word or
a combination of letters and numbers with no known meaning.187

180

If two parties use the same distinctive mark, the first to use the mark, known
as the senior user, will have priority in the mark. The exception is if the second
party to use the mark establishes a strong consumer identification with the mark
in a geographic area separate from the senior user’s area, in which case the second
party will have priority in that separate geographic area. See Dawn Donut Co. v.
Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 365 (2d Cir. 1959).
181
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1052, 1127.
182
Id. §§ 1058–1059.
183
Placement on the federal trademark register gives the trademark owner several
advantages. Among other things: (1) it gives constructive notice of the user’s
claim to the mark; (2) it provides prima facia evidence of ownership; (3) it permits
the owner to sue in federal rather than state court, 15 U.S.C. § 1114; (4) the right
to use the mark becomes virtually incontestable after five years, id. § 1065; and
(5) it allows the owner to obtain rights in a larger geographic area than allowed
under common law. Id. § 1115(a). See also U.S.P.T.O. v. Booking.com B.V.,
140 S. Ct. 2298 (2020); Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019). If a mark is
not placed on the Principal Register because it is descriptive and not distinctive,
it may be placed on the Supplemental Register if it has potential to become
distinctive. Placement on the Supplemental Register confers few benefits;
however, it allows the owner to display the registered symbol, which may
discourage infringers. It may also help establish secondary meaning. See
Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. at 2302.
184
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763,
768 (1992); Sugar Busters, LLC v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258, 267 (5th Cir. 1999);
A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 299 n.9 (3d Cir. 1986); Thompson
Med. Co. v. Pfizer, Inc. 753 F.2d 208, 215–16 (2d Cir. 1985). State laws may
provide similar protections to registration on the Principal Register. See, e.g.,
Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. IJR Capital Invs., LLC, 891 F.3d 178, 184–85 (5th Cir. 2018)
(applying Texas law).
185
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9–11 (2d Cir.
1976).
186
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210–11 (2000);
Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 10–11.
187
Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 11 n.12.
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Examples of fanciful marks would be Pepsi, Kodak, and Exxon.188
Arbitrary marks are actual words with a known meaning that have no
association to or relationship with the protected product.189 Examples
would be Apple for computers and Blackberry for a personal digital
assistant. Suggestive marks are those that have no immediate association
to the product but suggest its characteristics or qualities.190 For example,
Speedi Bake, Noburst, Dri-Foot, Sno-Rake and Frankwurst have each
been found to be suggestive marks.191
Marks that describe the qualities or characteristics of a product are
called descriptive marks.192 Descriptive marks receive trademark
protection only when they have acquired secondary meaning.193
Secondary meaning arises when consumers have begun to associate the
trademark with the source of the product rather than the product itself.194
Finally, marks that describe the type or class of product itself are generic
and are not registerable.195 Some examples of marks that have become
generic and therefore have lost their trademark status include: aspirin,
heroin, cellophane, escalator, trampoline, thermos, dry ice, kerosene, yoyo, and zipper.196

188

See TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1209.01(a) (Oct.
2018) [hereinafter TMEP].
189
Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 11 n.12.
190
Id. at 10–11.
191
See TMEP § 1209.01(a).
192
Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985).
193
Id.; see also Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Robin Singh Educ. Servs., Inc.,
799 F.3d 437, 445 (5th Cir. 2015).
194
Inwood Lab’ys, Inc. v. Ives Lab’ys, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982). In
determining whether secondary meaning exists, courts will weigh several factors,
including: (1) association of the trademark with a particular source by actual
purchasers, typically measured by customer surveys; (2) length, degree, and
exclusivity of use; (3) amount and manner of advertising; (4) amount of sales and
number of customers; (5) intentional copying; and (6) unsolicited media coverage
of the product embodying the mark. See Converse, Inc. v. ITC, 909 F.3d 1110
(Fed. Cir. 2018).
195
15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(e), 1064(c); Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 9. In
U.S.P.T.O. v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298 (2020), the Supreme Court
rejected the contention of the Patent and Trademark Office that the combination
of a generic word and “.com” is generic. “A ‘generic.com’ term might also
convey to consumers a source-identifying characteristic: an association with a
particular website.” Id. at 2306. A registered mark may be cancelled at any time
on the ground that it has become generic. 15 U.S.C. §1064(3).
196
See Mary Beth Quirk, 15 Product Trademarks That Have Become Victims of
Genericization,
CONSUMER
REPS.
(July
19,
2014),
https://www.consumerreports.org/consumerist/15-product-trademarks-that-havebecome-victims-of-genericization/. In the context of food, the mark “pretzel
crisps” has been held to be generic for a pretzel cracker snack. See Princeton
Vanguard, LLC v. Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc., 786 F.3d 960, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
For other examples of food marks held to be generic, see Kellogg Co. v. National
Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) (shredded wheat), Schwan’s IP, LLC v. Kraft
Pizza Co., 460 F.3d 971 (8th Cir. 2006) (brick oven pizza), Weiss Noodle Co. v.
Golden Cracknel & Specialty Co., 290 F.2d 845 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (egg noodles),
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Trade dress similarly receives different levels of protection
depending on whether the trade dress consists of product packaging or
product design. Trade dress originally included only the packaging or
“dressing” of a product,197 but subsequently was expanded to include the
design of the product itself.198 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.199
involved packaging in the form of restaurant design. Taco Cabana’s
claimed trade dress consisted of “a festive eating atmosphere having
interior dining and patio areas decorated with artifacts, bright colors,
paintings and murals.”200 Subsequently, Two Pesos opened a Mexican
restaurant with a motif similar to Taco Cabana’s, and Taco Cabana sued
for trade dress infringement.201 The Supreme Court held that product
packaging, in this case, restaurant décor, may be inherently distinctive and
therefore, immediately protectable without a showing of secondary
meaning.202
Eight years later, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers,
Inc.,203 the Supreme Court determined the circumstances in which a
product’s design, as opposed to its packaging, is distinctive and therefore
protectable in an action for infringement of unregistered trade dress.
Samara Brothers, Inc. was a manufacturer of children’s clothing.204 WalMart took pictures of Samara’s designs and had its clothing manufacturer
produce a very similar line of clothing, which Wal-Mart then sold.205
Samara brought an action for trade dress infringement.206 Wal-Mart
defended on the ground that Samara’s clothing design had not acquired
secondary meaning, and therefore was not protectable.207 The Supreme
Court agreed, concluding that product design, like color,208 can never be
inherently distinctive.209 In so ruling, the Court distinguished the product

and Skinner Mfg. Co. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 143 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1944) (raisin
bran).
197
Storck USA, L.P. v. Farley Candy Co., 14 F.3d 311 (7th Cir. 1994) (pictures
and graphics on packages of candy); First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809
F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1987) (antifreeze bottles); Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc’s B.R.
Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1987) (restaurant design); Chevron Chem. Co.
v. Voluntary Purchasing Grps., Inc., 659 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1981) (bottles of insect
spray and packaging for bone meal).
198
Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc. v. Sangiacomo N.A. Ltd, 187 F.3d 363 (4th Cir.
1999) (bedroom furniture); Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir.
1995) (sweaters); Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 1995)
(notebooks).
199
505 U.S. 763 (1992).
200
Id. at 765.
201
Id.
202
Id. at 776.
203
529 U.S. 205 (2000).
204
Id. at 207.
205
Id. at 207–08.
206
Id. at 208.
207
Id.
208
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (finding that
color can never be inherently distinctive but may receive trademark protection
upon a showing that it has acquired secondary meaning).
209
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 216.

179

Food for Thought

[Vol. 19

design involved in Wal-Mart from the product packaging involved in Two
Pesos.210 In short, while product packaging may be immediately
protectable by trademark if it is inherently distinctive, the design of a
product itself may never be protectable by trademark unless and until it
has acquired secondary meaning.
Functionality is another limitation to the availability of trade dress
protection for packaging and product design. In TrafFix Devices, Inc. v.
Marketing Displays, Inc.,211 the Supreme Court noted that § 1125(a)(3) of
the Lanham Act does not allow trade dress protection for functional
product features.212 In TrafFix Devices, the plaintiff had acquired utility
patents for a dual spring design for outdoor signs. 213 After the patents
expired, the plaintiff sued a competitor using a similar design for trade
dress infringement.214 The Court held that a utility patent was strong
evidence that the features claimed were functional.215 In this case, the dual
spring design was both the central claim advanced in the expired patents
and the essential feature of the alleged trade dress.216 Because the
defendant established functionality, the Court held that the trade dress
claim was barred.217
Likewise, in the context of food products, the non-functionality of
a particular design or packaging is required for protection as trade dress.
In Application of World’s Finest Chocolate, Inc.,218 the court held that the
packaging of a chocolate candy bar was not functional because it provided
no utilitarian advantages; meanwhile, other packaging designs were
available.219 By contrast, in Universal Frozen Foods, Co. v. LambWeston, Inc.,220 the product design for the shape of “curlicue fries” was
found to be functional because the configuration resulted in “superior
yield, lower portion cost, better cosmetic plate coverage, improved flavor,
faster service time and better heat penetration.”221
Food designs that have federally registered trademarks include:
Pepperidge Farm’s Milano Cookies,222 Carvel’s Fudgie the Whale Ice
210

The Court noted that product design almost always serves purposes other than
source identification, including aesthetic purposes. Id. at 213.
211
532 U.S. 23 (2001).
212
Id. at 29.
213
Id. at 25.
214
Id. at 26.
215
Id. at 29–30.
216
Id. at 30.
217
Id. at 29–30, 33.
218
474 F.2d 1012 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
219
Id. at 1014–15.
220
697 F. Supp. 389 (D. Or. 1987).
221
Id. at 392. Accord Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d
569, 572–73 (2d Cir. 1959) (finding neither proof of secondary meaning nor that
Pepto-Bismol’s pink color was entitled to trademark protection because it served
the functional purpose of giving the medicine a more pleasing appearance and
therefore more likely to be accepted by an upset stomach).
222
Registration No. 3,852,499. In December 2015, Pepperidge Farm sued
Trader Joe’s for selling Milano cookies that Pepperidge Farm claimed infringed
its trademark. The lawsuit was settled by the parties. David Godman, Trader
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Cream Cake,223 Dairy Queen ice cream curl on top,224 Hershey’s kisses,225
Hershey’s chocolate bar,226 Frito Lay Sun Chips,227 Izzy’s ice cream shop
for ice cream cones topped with a baby scoop of ice cream,228 J. Dawgs
for hotdogs with crisscross cuts,229 General Mills’ Bugles,230 Tootsie Rolls
Tootsie Pops,231 and Magnolia Bakery’s cupcakes bearing its signature
swirl icing.232
2. Trademark Infringement
The Lanham Act permits the holder of a registered trademark to
file a trademark infringement claim against any person who, without the
registered trademark holder’s consent, uses “in commerce any
reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark
in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising
of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.”233 The plaintiff in
a trademark infringement action must prove that the mark is valid,234 the
Joe’s settles Milano cookies infringement spat, CNN BUS. (Mar. 31, 2016, 9:19
AM), https://money.cnn.com/2016/03/31/news/companies/trader-joes-milanopepperidge-farm/index.html.
223
Registration No. 3,094,986.
224
Registration No. 2,183,417.
225
Registration No. 2,138,566.
226
Registration No. 4,322,502.
227
Registration No. 3,293,236.
228
Registration No. 4,078,826.
229
Registration No. 4,550,211.
230
Registration No. 1,929,420.
231
Registration No. 1,459,412.
232
Registration No. 4,519,385 (Supplemental Register). Magnolia Bakery sued
one of its former employees who had opened a competing café for selling
cupcakes with swirl icing. The former employee went out of business. Eliza
Murphy, Magnolia Bakery in Buttercream Battle with Former Employee, ABC
NEWS (Sept. 12, 2012) https://abcnews.go.com/blogs/lifestyle/2012/09/magnoliabakery-in-buttercream-battle-with-former-employee.
233
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2018). A prevailing party in a trademark infringement
action may:
[R]ecover (1) defendant’s profits, (2) any damages sustained by the
plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action. . . . . In assessing profits the
plaintiff shall be required to prove defendant’s sales only; defendant
must prove all elements of cost or deduction claimed. In assessing
damages the court may enter judgment, according to the circumstances
of the case, for any sum above the amount found as actual damages, not
exceeding three times such amount. If the court shall find that the amount
of the recovery based on profits is either inadequate or excessive the
court may in its discretion enter judgment for such sum as the court shall
find to be just, according to the circumstances of the case . . . . The court
in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing
party.
Id. § 1117(a). The infringing items may also be ordered destroyed. Id. § 1118.
234
Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 194 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he
threshold requirement [is] that the plaintiff must possess a protectable mark,
which must be satisfied before infringement can be actionable.”). Federally
registered marks are presumed to be valid. See supra, note 183.
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plaintiff is the senior user of the mark, and the defendant’s use of the mark
creates a likelihood of confusion in the minds of the consumer.235
Therefore, trademark infringement actions focus on whether the consumer
is likely to be confused as to the source of a product or service by a party’s
use of a particular mark.236
The likelihood of confusion test was applied in a case involving
food design in Nabisco Brands, Inc. v. Conusa Corp.,237 where the trial
court found that defendant’s sale of a round hard candy with a hole in the
middle infringed upon the trademark of the LifeSaver candy.238 The court
rejected the defendant’s contention that because its candy had raised letters
on one side, it was sufficiently different from the LifeSaver candy so as
not to create a likelihood of confusion.239 More recently, in Denbra IP

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). See also Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. IJR Capital Invs.
L.L.C., 891 F.3d 178, 185 (5th Cir. 2018) (explaining that the plaintiff must show
confusion to prevail); Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 516–17
(10th Cir. 1987) (citing LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71 (2d Cir.
1985)) (stating that confusion is required to succeed for a trade dress
infringement); Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1535 (11th Cir. 1986)
(“[T]o prevail on a trade dress infringement claim under § 43(a) [of the Lanham
Act], the plaintiff must prove three elements: 1) its trade dress is inherently
distinctive or has acquired secondary meaning, 2) its trade dress is primarily nonfunctional, and 3) the defendant's trade dress is confusingly similar.”).
236
In Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs., Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961),
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals articulated a multi-factor test to determine
whether a particular use of a mark creates a likelihood of confusion in the minds
of the consumer. The Second Circuit considers:
[T]he strength of [the] mark, the degree of similarity between the two
marks, the proximity of the products, the likelihood that the prior owner
will bridge the gap, actual confusion, and the reciprocal of defendant’s
good faith in adopting its own mark, the quality of defendant’s product,
and the sophistication of the buyers.
Id. Most Circuits follow a similar multi-factor test in determining likelihood of
confusion. See, e.g., Zheng Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1371–73
(Fed. Cir. 2018); Georgia-Pacific Consumer Prods. LP v. Four-U-Packaging, Inc.,
701 F.3d 1093, 1100–01 (6th Cir. 2012); Pizzaria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d
1522, 1527 (4th Cir. 1984); Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d
Cir. 1983); Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d
1201, 1205 (1st Cir. 1983) (citing Pignons S.A. de Mecanique de Precision v.
Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d 482, 487 (1st Cir. 1981)); SquirtCo v. Seven-Up, Co.,
628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980); AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d
341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979), abrogated on other grounds by Mattel, Inc. v.
Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 810 n.19 (9th Cir. 2003). See also In re
E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973); Stone Lion
Cap. Partners, L.P. v. Lion Cap. LLP, 746 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (relying on
the multifactor test from In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co. to assess an
application for trademark registration). Not all factors are relevant to every case
and the courts may give the factors different weight depending on the facts of the
particular case. See In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361–62;
Georgia-Pacific Consumer Prods. LP, 701 F.3d at 1100–01.
237
722 F. Supp. 1287 (M.D.N.C. 1989), aff’d, 892 F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1989).
238
Id. at 1291–92.
239
Id. at 1289, 1291.
235
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Holdings, LLC v. Thornton,240 the trial court issued a preliminary
injunction against the defendant’s use of a frosting pattern on Bundt cakes
that was likely to cause confusion with the plaintiff’s frosting design.241
3. Trademark Dilution
An owner of a “famous” mark may also have a cause of action for
dilution against another party’s use of an identical or substantially similar
mark if the other party’s use of the mark hurts the value of the famous
mark by harming its reputation or impairing its distinctiveness.242 “[A]
mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general consuming public
. . . as a designation of source of the goods or services of the mark’s
owner.”243 Unlike a trademark infringement claim, a cause of action for
dilution may exist regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely
confusion, competition, or actual economic injury.244
There are two types of causes of action for trademark dilution:
tarnishment and blurring. In a tarnishment action, the issue is whether an
“association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and
a famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark.”245 In a
240

No. 4:20-CV-813-SDJ, 2021 WL 674238 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2021).
Id. at 9.
242
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
243
Id. § 1125(c)(2)(A).
In determining whether a mark possesses the requisite degree of
recognition, the court may consider all relevant factors, including the
following: (i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising
and publicity of the mark, whether advertised or publicized by the owner
or third parties. (ii) The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales
of goods or services offered under the mark. (iii) The extent of actual
recognition of the mark. (iv) Whether the mark was registered . . . .
Id.
244
Id. § 1125(c)(1).
245
Id. § 125(c)(2)(C).
Because tarnishment relates to reputation and
distinctiveness, cases often involve the use of a mark or substantially similar mark
in connection with some sex-related product. See, e.g., V Secret Catalogue, Inc.
v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 387–89 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding that the use of the
names “Victor’s Little Secret” or “Victor’s Secret” in connection with a store
selling sex toys and other sex-related products created a likelihood of dilution by
tarnishment to the Victoria’s Secret trademark that the defendant had not
overcome); Pfizer Inc. v. Sachs, 652 F. Supp. 2d 512, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(holding that the display of a Viagra-branded missile at “an adult entertainment
exhibition,” among other places, would likely dilute by tarnishment Pfizer’s
famous mark); Kraft Foods Holdings, Inc. v. Helm, 205 F. Supp. 2d 942, 949–50
(N.D. Ill. 2002) (finding that a pornographic website’s use of “King VelVeeda”
likely tarnished Kraft’s “Velveeta” trademark). Tarnishment has also been found
when a mark or substantially similar mark is used in connection with an inferior
product or creates a negative association. See, e.g., Perkins Sch. for the Blind v.
Maxi-Aids, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d 319, 323–24 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding the
complaint’s allegation that the defendant resold the plaintiff’s product with an
inferior warranty sufficiently alleged a claim for tarnishment); Harris Rsch., Inc.
v. Lydon, 505 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1166 (D. Utah 2007) (finding that the defendant’s
use of the mark “Chem-Who?” created a negative association with plaintiff’s
“Chem-Dry” mark sufficient for tarnishment).
241
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blurring action, the issue is whether there is an “association arising from
the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that
impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark.”246
Dilution in the food design context was the issue in Nabisco v. PF
Brands.247 This case centered on a goldfish-shaped orange cracker.
Pepperidge Farm had produced goldfish crackers continuously since 1962
and owned numerous trademark registrations for the appearance and name
of the cracker.248 In 1994, Pepperidge Farm launched an aggressive
marketing campaign of its goldfish cracker, targeted at children.249 The
cracker had also been the subject of substantial media coverage.250 In
1998, Nickelodeon Television Network approached Nabisco to explore a
joint promotion for its show, “CatDog.”251 Nabisco developed a CatDog
snack that consisted of small orange crackers in three shapes: the CatDog
character, a bone, and a fish.252 After Pepperidge Farm sent Nabisco a
cease and desist letter, Nabisco brought a cause of action for declaratory
relief.253 Pepperidge Farm countersued for trademark infringement and

246

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B).
In determining whether a mark or trade name is likely to cause dilution
by blurring, the court may consider all relevant factors, including the
following: (i) The degree of similarity between the mark or trade name
and the famous mark. (ii) The degree of inherent or acquired
distinctiveness of the famous mark. (iii) The extent to which the owner
of the famous mark is engaging in substantially exclusive use of the
mark. (iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark. (v) Whether
the user of the mark or trade name intended to create an association with
the famous mark. (vi) Any actual association between the mark or trade
name and the famous mark.
Id. See, e.g., Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n v. JSL Corp., 610 F.3d 1088, 1089, 1091–92
(9th Cir. 2010) (finding that the defendant’s use of the name “eVisa” for an online
education business diluted the plaintiff’s “Visa” trademark by creating a new
meaning of the word); Perfumebay.com Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 506 F.3d 1165, 1179–
81 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that the name “Perfumebay” diluted the uniqueness of
eBay’s trademark); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d 1868,
1886, 1888–90 (T.T.A.B. 2011) (finding that Mattel’s use of the trademark
“Motown Metal” on its Hot Wheels cars was likely to dilute the “Motown”
trademark); Nat’l Pork Bd. v. Supreme Lobster & Seafood Co., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d
1479, 1486, 1497 (T.T.A.B. 2010) (finding that the use of the slogan “The Other
Red Meat” for fresh and frozen salmon was likely to dilute the trademark “The
Other White Meat”).
247
191 F.3d 208, 212 (2d Cir. 1999), overruled in part by Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 432–34 (2003) (holding that proof of actual
dilution is required by the Federal Trademark Dilution Act). Congress
subsequently amended the federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 to provide that
a “likelihood of dilution by tarnishment” is the applicable burden of proof. See V
Secret Catalogue, Inc., 605 F.3d at 387.
248
Nabisco, Inc., 191 F.3d at 212.
249
Id. at 212–13.
250
Id. at 213.
251
Id.
252
Id.
253
Id.
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dilution under state and federal law, and sought a preliminary injunction
prohibiting Nabisco from distributing the CatDog snack.254
The trial court denied the preliminary injunction on Pepperidge
Farm’s infringement claim, but granted it on the dilution claim.255 Nabisco
appealed.256 The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s issuance of a
preliminary judgment after reviewing the relevant factors, concluding that
“Pepperidge Farm has demonstrated a high likelihood of success in
proving that Nabisco’s commercial use of its goldfish shape will dilute the
distinctiveness of Pepperidge Farm’s nearly identical famous senior
mark.”257

II. SHOULD THERE BE LIMITATIONS ON OR CHANGES TO THE
AVAILABILITY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION FOR
RECIPES AND FOOD DESIGN?
We now turn to the overarching questions of whether there should
be intellectual property protection for recipes and food design at all and, if
so, under what circumstances. In addition, we consider whether the
interests of competition as well as innovation are furthered by such
protection. We proceed first by arguing that a combination of intellectual
property protections may best suit recipes and food design. We then
consider potential changes to the current state of protections, as outlined
above, through a series of three questions. First, should food be considered
an article of manufacture for design patent purposes? Second, should food
design be considered functional and therefore not eligible for design patent
or trademark protection? Third, should doctrinal bootstrapping be
eliminated?

A. There is No Single Solution for the Protection of Recipes and
Food Designs
As can be seen from the previous discussion, intellectual property
protection for food design is extremely varied as to its scope and
availability. There is no one size that fits all purposes, and the form of
intellectual property protection that works best will likely depend heavily
on the context. Recipes, to the extent that they are unique and kept
confidential, are good candidates for trade secret protection, which can last
as long as the recipe remains secret. The recipe owner must implement
measures that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its
secrecy. On the downside, trade secret protection is easily lost if the recipe
is disclosed, and there is no way to prevent a competitor from
independently developing the same recipe or reverse engineering it,
neither of which will lead to liability for misappropriation.
The alternatives to trade secret protection are copyright and utility
patent protection, which are both considered robust forms of intellectual
property because of their exclusivity and the rights conferred. While long
in duration, copyright protection is less useful since it protects original
254

Id.
Id.
256
Id. at 212.
257
Id. at 222.
255
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expression only and does not apply to facts, procedures, and methods.258
Thus, copyright may protect a recipe’s original, artistic, or creative
elements, but not the underlying recipe itself, which is likely to be a list of
ingredients and a procedure for combining them. On the other hand, a
compilation of recipes may be copyrightable if there is demonstrated
originality in the selection, coordination, or arrangement of the recipes.259
Even so, the recipes themselves will remain uncopyrightable.
Utility patent protection remains the other alternative to trade
secret protection because it is available for processes and methods, and it
is more likely to apply to the process for producing a food product or a
particular ingredient than the dish itself.260 Nevertheless, utility patent
protection has several practical drawbacks. The process of obtaining a
patent can be lengthy and expensive. Moreover, recipes must be publicly
disclosed as part of the examination process—rendering the requirements
of novelty and nonobviousness a steep hill to climb.261 Even if a recipe is
truly new because it involves a previously unknown cooking technique or
combination of ingredients, it may amount to an obvious or predictable
variation on other known recipes.262 In addition, the term of utility patent
protection is limited to twenty years, after which the recipe falls into the
public domain and becomes freely available.263
When it comes to food design, trade secret protection holds
limited value if the trade secret is identified as the appearance or
configuration of the food item itself.264 Trade secrets cannot protect what
is easily observable—although the process of creating the design might be
protectable if it has economic value is due to its secrecy.265 Likewise,
copyright protection is not particularly useful because food is perishable,
and therefore it cannot fulfill the requirement that the work be fixed in a
medium that is sufficiently stable and permanent.266 In addition, the design
or presentation of the dish, even if it is independently identifiable, may not
be separable from the food itself as viewed as an edible, useful article.267

258

17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1990).
See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
260
Daniel Joshua Ganz, Comment, Intellectual Property Protection for Food:
Balancing Competing Policy Objectives, 40 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 128, 132
(2019).
261
See supra notes 91–102 and accompanying text.
262
See Naomi Straus, Comment, Trade Dress Protection for Cuisine: Monetizing
Creativity in a Low-IP Industry, 60 UCLA L. REV. 182, 198 (2012) (citing 35
U.S.C. §§ 102–103) (arguing that “patent laws cannot be used to protect restaurant
dishes that are created using classic cooking techniques or fail to meet the high
standards of originality that the patent system requires because these dishes do not
fulfill the requirement that an invention be novel and nonobvious”).
263
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
264
See UTSA § 1(4)(i).
265
Id.
266
17 U.S.C. § 101.
267
But see Hannah Brown, Having Your Cake and Eating it Too: Intellectual
Property Protection for Cake Design, 56 IDEA 31, 53–54 (2016) (arguing that
cake icing designs are independently identifiable and separable from the cake as
a useful article).
259
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Instead, design patent or trade dress protection may be the
preferred option for food designs. Design patents will allow the patent
owner to exclude others from making, using, or selling food items
incorporating the design. Of course, to be protected, the design must first
overcome the high bars of novelty and nonobviousness; and be ornamental
rather than related to any functional aspect of the food. As with utility
patents, the term of protection is limited, and even more so since the
duration for a design patent is fifteen years.268 Lastly, trade dress
protection is also a viable option. The design must be have acquired
secondary meaning to have become distinctive to the source or supplier of
the food.269
Additionally, as with design patent protection, the food design
must be nonfunctional, both as to any utilitarian purpose related to the food
and as to any aesthetic necessity.270 Once a food design qualifies for trade
dress protection, it will remain protected as long as it remains in
commercial use.271 A product can be protected by a design patent and by
trade dress rights as long as the particular design does not have a utilitarian
function.272 In fact, the existence of a design patent covering a product is
a factor that can lead to a presumption of nonfunctionality for trade dress
purposes.273 As this discussion suggests, recipes and food designs might
be best protected by a combination of intellectual property rights.

B. Should Food be Considered an Article of Manufacture for Design
Patent Purposes?
Design patents are limited to designs for “articles of
manufacture.”274 What constitutes an article of manufacture is not
statutorily defined.275 The Supreme Court defined an “article of
manufacture” as “the production of articles for use from raw or prepared
materials by giving to these materials new forms, qualities, properties or
combinations, whether by hand-labor or by machinery.”276 However, not
268

35 U.S.C. § 173.
See supra notes 203–210 and accompanying text.
270
See infra notes 295–324 and accompanying text.
271
15 U.S.C. §§ 1058–1059.
272
See, e.g., In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964);
Topps Co. v. Gerrit J. Verburg Co., No. 96 CIV. 7302 (RWS), 1996 WL 719381
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
273
See In re Becton, Dickinson & Co., 675 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Am.
Beverage Corp. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 2d 555 (W.D. Pa. 2013).
274
35 U.S.C. § 171.
275
For a discussion of the historical meaning of article of manufacture, see Sarah
Burstein, The “Article of Manufacture” Today, 31 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 781, 812–
817 (2018).
276
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (quoting Am. Fruit
Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931)). See also Tide-Water Oil
Co. v. United States, 171 U.S. 210, 216 (1898) (“The primary meaning of the
word ‘manufacture’ is something made by hand, as distinguished from a natural
growth, but, as machinery has largely supplanted this primitive method, the word
is now ordinarily used to denote an article upon the material of which labor has
been expended to make the finished product.”). More recently, the Supreme Court
looked to dictionary definitions of “article” and “manufacture,” and took the
269
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every article of manufacture is eligible for design patent protection.
Articles of manufacture, which are more or less hidden from view when
in use, are not the proper subject matter for design patents.277 Similarly,
designs that create an appearance that cannot “ever really matter to
anybody” have been denied patents.278
Further, courts have held that to be a “manufacture” or an “article
of manufacture,” some form of permanence is required. In re Nuijten279
involved a utility patent application for a signal with an embedded digital
watermark encoded. The court was called on to determine whether the
signals fell within any of the categories for utility patent eligibility. 280 In
addressing whether the signals were “manufactures,” the Nuijten majority
conceded that the signals were man-made, but held that some article must
result from the process of manufacture.281 The court also held that articles
of manufacture must be tangible and have some “semblance of
permanence.”282 The court concluded that the signals were not
manufactures and therefore not eligible for utility patent protection.283
Some forty years earlier, the court reviewing a design patent
application in In re Hruby284 found, in connection with a design patent
application, that the portion of a water fountain that was composed entirely
of water in motion was an “article of manufacture.”285 While at first blush,
Nuijten and Hruby appear to be inconsistent, there is some similarity in
their holdings. Like Nuijten, Hruby placed importance on “permanence”
in reaching its holding. The court noted that the dissenting member of the
Patent Office Board of Appeals (which had rejected the design patent) had
stated: “it is recognized that if certain parameters such as orifice
configuration, water pressure and freedom from disturbing atmospheric
conditions are maintained, the ornamental shape of the fountain will
remain substantially constant and will at times present an over-all
appearance virtually the same from day to day.”286 The court agreed with
this statement of permanence of design: “We agree with the dissenter on
that and would add that the permanence of any design is a function of the
broad view that an article of manufacture is simply a thing made by hand or
machine. Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 435 (2016).
277
E.g., Rowe v. Blodgett & Clapp Co., 112 F. 61 (2d Cir. 1901) (horseshoe
calk—a blunt projection on a horseshoe to provide traction—unpatentable);
Bradley v. Eccles, 126 F. 945 (2d Cir. 1903) (washer for thill coupling
unpatentable); Pashek v. Dunlop Tyre & Rubber Co., 8 F.2d 640 (N.D. Ohio
1925) (tire tread unpatentable).
278
N. British Rubber Co. v. Racine Rubber Tire Co. of N.Y., Inc., 271 F. 936, 938
(2d Cir. 1921) (“It has been well said that there are some articles of manufacture
. . . incapable of being the subjects of design patents, for want of reason to suppose
that their appearance can ever really matter to anybody.”).
279
500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
280
Id. at 1348.
281
Id. at 1356.
282
Id. (“In essence, energy embodying the claimed signal is fleeting and is devoid
of any semblance of permanence during transmission.”).
283
Id. at 1357.
284
373 F.2d 997 (Cust. & Pat. App. 1967).
285
Id. at 1002.
286
Id. at 999.
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materials in which it is embodied and the effects of the environment
thereon.”287 The court then pointed to Roman and French fountains that
were built hundreds of years ago that still produce the same water design
today.288
Both Nuijten and Hruby conclude that an article of manufacture
must exhibit a degree of tangibility and permanence. Copyright and
design patent would then share similar requirements of fixation in a
tangible medium.289 The Court’s recognition that articles of manufacture
be “fixed” in the copyright sense acknowledges the inherent overlap
between design patent and copyright protection, namely their use to
protect the aesthetically pleasing aspects of a utilitarian article.290 In fact,
design patents had their antecedents in the law of copyright.291 If
tangibility and permanence are necessary to qualify for design patent
protection, then one must ask whether food design also qualifies. Recall
the holding of Kim Seng Co. v. J & A Importers, Inc.292 that food is not
287

Id.
Id. Rather than examining Hruby in any depth, the Nuijten Court attempted to
distinguish it on the grounds that Hruby was addressing a design patent, while
Nuijten was addressing a utility patent. This is a distinction without meaning.
The notion that there is a difference between “manufacture” as used with utility
patents and “articles of manufacture” as used with design patents was rejected as
early as In re Hadden, 20 F.2d 275, 276 (App. D.C. 1927) (“It is difficult to
perceive how a thing may be a manufacture, without producing an article of
manufacture.”). See also Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 435
(2016) (interpretation of “article of manufacture” in design patent and
“manufacture” in utility patent is consistent); 8 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS §
23.03[2] (2013) (noting that “article of manufacture” in §171 includes what would
be considered a “manufacture” within the meaning of § 101).
289
See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
290
For a discussion of the intersection between design patents and copyrights, see
Valerie V. Flugge, Note, Works of Applied Art: An Expansion of Copyright
Protection, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 245–47 (1982). Because both protect the
aesthetic features of functional articles, copyright and patents have significant
overlap between the subject matter they protect. By contrast, proving design
patent infringement is less demanding than that required for copyright
infringement. Design patent infringement focuses on whether the ordinary
observer would believe that the accused design is the same as the overall patented
design based on their similarities. See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543
F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding “that the ‘ordinary observer’ test should
be the sole test for determining whether a design patent has been infringed”).
Copyright infringement requires proof that the defendant had access to the
copyrighted work and that the similarities between the copyrighted work and the
allegedly infringing work are substantial. E.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (assessing whether a taken portion of a
copyrighted literary work was substantial). For further discussion of the
similarities and differences in design patent and copyright infringement, see
Sebastian M. Torres Rodriguez, The Convergence of Design Patent Law,
Trademark Law, and Copyright Law for Better Protection of Intellectual Property
for Commercial Designs, 5 U. P.R. BUS. L. J. 122, 139–42 (2014).
291
See Jason J. Du Mont & Mark D. Janis, The Origins of American Design Patent
Protection, 88 IND. L. J. 837, 856–63 (2013) (discussing the historical
development of design patents as originating in British design copyright law).
292
810 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
288
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eligible for copyright protection because it is intended to be eaten, and thus
not stable or permanent enough to be a work of fixed authorship. 293 By
analogy, food is insufficiently stable or permanent enough to be an article
of manufacture.
Additionally, at least one commentator has argued that
compositions of matter should not be considered an article of
manufacture.294 Professor Sarah Burstein, who has written extensively on
the meaning of the term, suggests that we should revert to the original
definition of “article of manufacture,” which excluded machines and
compositions of matter because they are not complete, unitary
structures.295 Similarly, such a construction would exclude food design
from design patent protection.

C. Should Food Design be Considered Functional and Therefore
Not Eligible for Design Patent or Trademark Protection?
Nonfunctionality is a key requirement for both design patent and
trade dress protection.296 The standard of functionality as between these
two forms of intellectual property differ significantly. In the design patent
context, the definition of functionality is narrow.297 By nature, an article
of manufacture incudes both utilitarian and ornamental features.298 A
leading test specifies that a design is functional only if it is “dictated by
function.”299 In Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,300 the
Supreme Court held that “[t]o qualify for protection, a design must present
an aesthetically pleasing appearance that is not dictated by function
alone.”301 Therefore, if a particular design is dictated solely by the use or
purpose of the article, it cannot be protected by a design patent.302
293

Id. at 1054.
Burstein, supra note 275, at 5. A “composition of matter” is a mixture or
combination of substances or elements. Saunders, supra note 35, at 108.
295
Burstein, supra note 275, at 5 (“[I]n 1887, the phrase ‘article of manufacture’
was a term of art in U.S. patent law that referred to a tangible item made by
humans—other than a machine or composition of matter—that had a unitary
structure and was complete in itself for use or for sale.”).
296
See supra notes 134–136, 211–217 and accompanying text.
297
See supra notes 134–136 and accompanying text.
298
The scope of design patent protection for an article having both functional and
ornamental features is limited strictly to the ornamental features. See Richardson
v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing L.A. Gear,
Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
299
Peter Lee & Madhavi Sunder, Design Patents: Law Without Design, 17 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 277, 287 (2013) (citing Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., 304 F.3d
1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. 489
U.S. 141, 148 (1989)). See, e.g., In re Webb, 916 F.2d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(discussing but not ruling on the issue of functionality as not raised on appeal).
300
489 U.S. 141 (1989).
301
Id. at 148.
302
See, e.g., Amini Innovation Corp. v. Anthony California, Inc., 439 F.3d 1365,
1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (discussing functionality for design patents); Rosco, 304
F.3d at 1378 (assessing the functionality of a mirror for design patent purposes);
L.A. Gear, Inc., 988 F.2d at 1123 (discussing the overlap between design and
function for a shoe).
294
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Consequently, there is likely more room for protectability with a design
patent because it is often relatively easy to find some nonfunctional
motivation for a design.303
Regarding trade dress, the test is somewhat inverted from that of
the design patent test. Proof of nonfunctionality generally requires a
showing that the design of the product “serves no purpose other than
identification.”304 Thus, two tests for determining functionality with
respect to trade dress have developed. First, the traditional test asks
whether a design is essential to the use or purpose of the article, or if it
affects the cost or quality of the article.305 This form of functionality is
known as utilitarian functionality.306 Strong evidence of utilitarian
functionality is found when there is a utility patent that specifically
discloses the utilitarian advantages of features sought to be protected as
trade dress.307 Another indication of utilitarian functionality is the
unavailability of alternative comparable designs or features that may be
used by competitors.308 Advertising that touts the usefulness of a
particular design and that it resulted from a relatively simple or
inexpensive method of manufacture is also relevant in assessing utilitarian
functionality.309
Ezaki Glico Kabushiki Kaisha v. Lotte International America
Corp.310 is an example of utilitarian functionality as applied to food. Ezaki
Glico involved “Pocky,” a chocolate-covered cookie stick with one end
uncoated with chocolate. Ezaki Glico, the creator and manufacturer,
claimed trade dress protection for the shape and appearance of the cookie
sticks.311 However, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the design
was utilitarian because the uncoated end of the stick allows the consumers
to hold it without getting chocolate on their hands as they eat it.312
Evidence cited by the court included that the manufacturer advertised “‘the
no mess handle of the Pocky stick,’ which ‘mak[es] it easier for multitasking without getting chocolate on your hands.’”313 Therefore, the
overall shape and look of Pocky was deemed to be functional. Similarly,
303

Lee and Sunder, supra note 299, at 286–87.
SK&F Co. v. Premo Pharm. Lab’ys, Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1063 (3d Cir. 1980).
305
See In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1340–41 (C.C.P.A.
1982).
306
See Saunders, supra note 35, at 543.
307
See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 30–31 (2001)
(stating that “[a] utility patent is strong evidence that the features therein claimed
are functional. If trade dress protection is sought for those features the strong
evidence of functionality based on the previous patent adds great weight to the
statutory presumption that features are deemed functional until proved otherwise
by the party seeking trade dress protection”); Jay Franco & Sons, Inc. v. Franek,
615 F.3d 855, 857 (7th Cir. 2010) (discussing TrafFix Devices).
308
Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnard Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
309
Id.
310
977 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2020), rehearing granted and opinion vacated by Ezaki
Glico Kabushiki Kaisha v. Lotte Int’l Am. Corp, 985 F.3d 1069 (3d Cir. 2021)
(mem.).
311
Id. at 263.
312
Id. at 268–69.
313
Id. at 269 (citations omitted).
304
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in Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Distrib., LLC,314 the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the design of Dippin’ Dots—small,
predominately separated colored beads or pieces of ice cream—
contributed to the product’s creamy taste and was thus functional and not
entitled to trade dress protection. 315 Finally, in William R. Warner & Co.
v. Eli Lilly & Co.,316 the Supreme Court concluded that adding chocolate
to a pharmaceutical mixture containing quinine to enhance color and offset
the mixture’s unpleasant taste was functional.317
The second nonfunctionality test is the competitive necessity test,
which asks whether the exclusive use of the design would put competitors
at a significant non-reputational disadvantage.318 Aesthetic functionality,
the second form of functionality, concerns a product’s required look—the
color and other design features provide an appearance that is essential to
the product and must be available to competitors.319 Often, this is
important when the product is purchased because of its visual appearance
or aesthetic appeal. In Wallace International Silversmiths, Inc v. Godinger
Silver Art, Co., Inc.,320 for instance, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
held that baroque patterns in the form of curls, scrolls, and flowers on the
handles of silverware were aesthetically functional features to the
appearance of baroque-style silverware, no matter the source of the
patterns.321 Consequently, the color white is aesthetically functional for
the color of icing on wedding cakes because white is the traditional color
associated with bridal gowns and weddings in western cultures. In
Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,322 for instance, the Second
Circuit found the pink color of Pepto-Bismol unprotectable trade dress

314

369 F.3d 1197 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1206. The court also ruled that the color of ice cream was functional
because it indicated the flavor of the ice cream. Id. at 1204. Note that flavors are
generally not protected as trademarks because consumers do not perceive them as
trademarks. See, e.g., In re N.V. Organon, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 1639, 1649 (T.T.A.B.
2006); see generally Leigha Santoro, Note, A Tasteful Expansion of the Already
Full Plate of Intellectual Property, 12 DREXEL L. REV. 171 (2019); Amanda E.
Compton, Acquiring a Flavor for Trademarks: There’s No Common Taste in the
World, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 340 (2010).
316
265 U.S. 526 (1924).
317
Id. at 529 (“Chocolate is used as an ingredient, not alone for the purpose of
imparting a distinctive color, but for the purpose of also making the preparation
peculiarly agreeable to the palate, to say nothing of its effect as a suspending
medium. While it is not a medicinal element in the preparation, it serves a
substantial and desirable use, which prevents it from being a mere matter of
dress.”).
318
See Epic Metals Corp. v. Souliere, 99 F.3d 1034, 1039 (11th Cir. 1996)
(holding that the design of a composite steel floor deck profile was functional
because it added to the quality and strength of the deck).
319
See Saunders, supra note 35, at 549–50.
320
916 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1990).
321
Id. at 81.
322 271 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1959)
315
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since pink soothed and pleased consumers with upset stomachs.323
Further, in McNeil Nutritionals, LLC v. Heartland Sweeteners LLC,324 the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania noted that color-coding of various
artificial sweeteners was an industry standard that consumers relied on to
differentiate their chemical compositions.325
Therefore, since many food designs also help make food more
attractive or fun to eat, a strong argument can be made that food design is
not solely to help consumers identify a food product’s origin. It is safe to
assume no manufacturer of a food product would choose an unappetizing
design for the sake of source identification. Take, for example, the Bubba
Burger. The Bubba Burger is a perforated and irregularly-shaped frozen
hamburger patty. The trademark application for its product design was
published for opposition on February 12, 2019.326 Bubba Foods was then
required to demonstrate that its perforated patty shape was not
functional.327 In response, Bubba Foods submitted declarations not only
detailing how the unique shape of the burgers lacked functionality in taste
or texture but also added to the cost of their manufacture.328 The examiner
later found the mark entitled to registration.329 But there are more
functionality issues at work here.
First, even though the Bubba Burger shape is “irregular,” the
options for modifying the shape are curtailed by the limitations on
creativity rendered by the traditional hamburger bun, which it must fit to
be commercially viable. Second, while Bubba Foods produced evidence
that the unusual shape of the burger did not contribute to taste or texture,
that does not address aesthetic functionality.330 This absence raises several
questions. Does the unusual shape make the burger more appealing and
interesting to eat? Will Bubba Burger now have the right to the exclusive
use of an irregular-shaped hamburger patty? Will the rest of the burger
manufacturers be constrained to the use of a round or square patty? Does
that put competitors at a significant non-reputational related disadvantage?
As these questions suggest, while not all food designs are functional, it is
likely that a great number of food designs would fail the aesthetic
functionality test. Conversely, given the more relaxed functionality
standard for design patents,331 food designs seeking patent protection

323

Id. at 572 (pink color was designed to present a pleasing appearance to the
customer and the sufferer; “a disordered stomach will accept that which is
pleasing and reject that which is repulsive”).
324
512 F. Supp. 2d 217 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
325
See id. at 222.
326
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 87815098 (filed Feb. 28, 2018).
327
Tommy Tobin & Jeannie Heffernan, Want Fries With that Trademark?, A.B.A.
(Mar.
13,
2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/intellectualproperty/practice/2019/want-fries-with-that-trademark-fast-food/.
328
Id.
329
The mark consists of the configuration of a hamburger patty, Registration No.
5742743.
330
See supra notes 318–25 and accompanying text.
331
See supra notes 134–136 and accompanying text.
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would likely meet the test in most instances—further underscoring the
uneven overlay between trade dress and design patents.

D. Should Doctrinal Bootstrapping be Eliminated?
The Supreme Court stated in Wal-Mart v. Samara, that if a product
design really were inherently source identifying but had not yet acquired
secondary meaning, the owner could obtain a design patent or copyright
protection in lieu of a trademark.332 This statement conflates the purposes
and elements of intellectual property protection. Trademark law is
concerned with product identification and preventing consumer
confusion.333 Meanwhile, copyright law and patent law encourage and
reward creativity and invention.334 Consequently, there is no requirement
under either law that the work or design be inherently source
identifying.335 Any product design, whether inherently source identifying
or not, is eligible for design patent or copyright protection, assuming the
requirements for such protections are met.336
Instead, in Wal-Mart v. Samara, the Supreme Court drew a map
for how an owner of a product design that is not inherently source
identifying may use the design patent period to acquire the secondary
meaning necessary to obtain trademark protection. The owner of a product
design may apply for a design patent.337 If successful, the owner will be
able to keep all competitors from the market for the term of the design
patent and use that time to develop secondary meaning without any threat
of competition.338 Once secondary meaning is established, the owner can
then apply for trademark registration, which, unlike a design patent, can
last indefinitely.339
In fact, empirical evidence shows that design patents are relatively
easy to obtain. One empirical study showed that nearly eighty-two percent
of design patent applications are approved without any objection from the
U.S Patent and Trademark Office.340 Over ninety percent of those design
332

529 U.S. 205, 214 (2000).
See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–65 (1995)
(outlining the purpose of trademark law and comparing its purpose to that of
patent law).
334
See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973) (citing U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8 cl. 8).
335
Otherwise stated, a trademark is neither a “writing” nor an “invention” within
the meaning of copyright and patent law. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94
(1879).
336
See supra notes 35–39, 126–128 and accompanying text.
337
35 U.S.C. § 171.
338
Patents give the owner a negative monopoly, allowing the owner to exclude all
others from the use of the design. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S.
287, 308 (1948); 35 U.S.C. § 154 (a)(1). Further, patents carry a presumption of
validity that can only be overcome with clear and convincing evidence. Microsoft
Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P‘ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011).
339
This situation is not unique to food design; it applies to any product design.
340
See Dennis D. Crouch, A Trademark Justification for Design Patent Rights 19
(Univ. of Mo. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper
No. 2010-17, 2010 (available at https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1469&context=facpubs)).
333
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patents are eventually approved, compared with an approval rate of only
forty-four percent for utility patents.341 Thus, other than the cost and time
of obtaining a design patent, there seem to be few barriers for a party to
developing secondary meaning during the design patent’s exclusivity
period without interference by competitors.
This ability to use the exclusivity period provided by a design
patent to develop secondary meaning, or “doctrinal bootstrapping,” has
been reviewed positively by some commentators.342 In contrast, another
commentator has referred to reliance on design patents for an exclusivity
period as “cheating the trademark system,” explaining that “[n]o other
types of trademark rights enjoy this exclusivity period for establishing
secondary meaning.”343 Recall also that an expired design patent creates
a presumption of nonfunctionality if the patent protected design and
proposed mark are identical, though this may be rebutted by other
evidence pointing to the functionality of the design.344
The ability to bootstrap a design patent into potentially indefinite
trademark protection cuts against the policy tradeoffs underlying patent
protection—in exchange for public disclosure, the owner is given a limited
term of protection.345 As the Supreme Court stated in United States v.
Dubilier Condenser Corp.,346 “upon the expiration of that [patent] period,
the knowledge of the invention inures to the people, who are thus enabled
without restrictions to practice it and profit by its use.”347 The Supreme
Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of free public use once
the term of the patent has expired.348
341

Id. at 18.
Id. at 31–32. See also Elizabeth D. Ferrill & Danny M. Awdeh, What Do
Sugarina’s Bento Box, the Heinz Dip & Squeeze, and the Pepperidge Farm
Goldfish Have in Common? Design Rights, MODERN REST. MGMT. (Oct. 22,
2018), https://modernrestaurantmanagement.com/what-do-sugarfinas-bento-boxthe-heinz-dip-squeeze-and-the-pepperidge-farm-goldfish-have-in-commondesign-rights/ (“With respect to design rights and trade dress rights, some
companies first secure design rights for their products because this provides
protection without proof of secondary meaning, giving the company time to
develop trade dress rights without interference from their competitors during the
term of the design patent.”).
343
Daniel H. Brean, Enough is Enough: Time to Eliminate Design Patents and
Rely on More Appropriate Copyright and Trademark Protection for Product
Designs, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 325, 364 (2008).
344
See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
345
See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (explaining
that the government trades a term of exclusive right in exchange for public
disclosure that will “stimulate ideas and the eventual development of further
significant advances in the art”).
346
289 U.S. 178 (1933).
347
Id. at 187. See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230
(1964) (“[W]hen [a] patent expires the monopoly created by it expires, too, and
the right to make the article . . . passes to the public.”).
348
See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (“First,
patent law seeks to foster and reward invention; second, it promotes disclosure of
inventions, to stimulate further innovation and to permit the public to practice the
invention once the patent expires; third, the stringent requirements for patent
342
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Many commentators have proposed that the scope of design patent
protection be limited or even eliminated since design patents, copyright,
and trademark protections overlap.349 One approach to eliminate this
concern would be to have the product design owner choose between design
patent, copyright, or trademark. However, lower courts have rejected this
“election” approach under the current statutory scheme.350 For instance,
in Application of Mogen David Wine Corp., the now defunct the U.S.
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals observed that trademark rights do
not “extend” the patent monopoly to justify the availability of trademark
protection after the design patent expires.351 The court pointed out that
while a design patent gives the owner a power to exclude others from using
the design, a trademark owner must prove that another party’s subsequent
design use creates customer confusion.352 While the Supreme Court has
yet to rule on this issue, in TrafFix Devices, Inc.,353 the Court implied that
successive trademark protection could be obtained were the requirements
for such protection met, despite denying trademark protection on the
grounds that the design at issue was functional.354
However, permitting a design patent owner to bootstrap into
trademark registration clashes with patent protection’s underlying policy
concerns. Once a patent term expires, the public is supposed to be enabled
to practice the invention without restriction and to profit from its use.355
The appropriate question then is whether successive trademark protection
is consistent with the policies pursuant to which the patent monopoly was
protection seek to assure that ideas in the public domain remain there for the free
use of the public.”); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,
157 (the “centerpiece of federal patent policy” is its “ultimate goal of public
disclosure and use”).
349
See Bream, supra note 343, at 326–28 (calling for the elimination of design
patent protection and relying instead on copyright and trademark); Ralph D.
Clifford & Richard J. Peltz-Steele, The Constitutionality of Design Patents, 14
CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 553 (2015) (arguing that design patents are not
authorized by the Constitution); Lee & Sunder, supra note 299, at 277 (arguing
that even the most persuasive and defensible justifications for design patents
counsel a limited right at best).
350
See Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 638 (7th Cir. 1993) (“In sum, courts
have consistently held that a product’s different qualities can be protected
simultaneously, or successively, by more than one of the statutory means for
protection of intellectual property.”); Application of Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389,
1393 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (holding a design may be both the subject of copyright and
design patent); see also 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS §7.91 (5th ed. 2021
update) (“In the early years of the Lanham Act, the Patent Office held that a
product or container design covered by a design patent was unregistrable as a
trademark. But by 1959, the Office had changed its position.”). For a discussion
of the benefits and detriments of overlapping intellectual property rights, see Viva
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granted in the first place. A trademark owner has the right to exclude
others from using the product design upon a showing of the likelihood of
confusion or, in the case of dilution, upon establishing that the trademark
is famous.356 This right significantly restricts the public’s ability to profit
from patented designs.
In addition to whether doctrinal bootstrapping is consistent with
patent law policies, fairness issues are also involved. Blurring the patent
and trademark laws may allow parties to game the system by providing
unfair advantages to those who can leverage the market for the fifteen year
patent exclusivity period to develop secondary meaning and thereafter
secure trade dress protection.
For our purposes, this problem would be eliminated if food design
was protected by design patent or trade dress, but not both. This article
notes several ways that overlapping protections might be eliminated. If
food is excluded from categorization as an article of manufacture, it would
not be eligible for design patent protection, leaving trade dress as the only
form of intellectual property protection. Conversely, if virtually all food
design were deemed aesthetically functional, design patent protection
would be available with limited to no trade dress protection. However, if
food is both (a) excluded from categorization as an article of manufacture
and (b) almost always aesthetically functional, no intellectual property
protection for food design at all could be another option.
However, these solutions are not ideal. Having no design patent
protection would seem to be advantageous to larger companies and hurt
smaller entrepreneurs, because the larger companies could copy a food
design before it was able to acquire secondary meaning. Although not
involving food design, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc.357
presents a good example of how this could happen. Wal-Mart
intentionally copied Samara’s clothing designs before they were able to
acquire secondary meaning.358 Providing no trade dress protection would
present similar issues because protection for food design would then be
limited to the fifteen-year term of a design patent, at which point it would
be freely available to the public to use. In instances where food design is
clearly source identifying, such as with the Pepperidge Farm goldfish
crackers, the policy of protecting against public confusion as to the source
of the food product would not be served after the patent term expired.359
The prospect of having no intellectual property protection for food design
at all also does not seem reasonable.
A possible solution to address these issues is to re-examine the
wisdom of allowing the owner of a design patent to simultaneously or
successively register the configuration as a trademark. The U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office once prohibited a trademark registration to the
owner of a design patent.360 While some lower courts have rejected this
356
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approach, the issue has yet to be resolved by the Supreme Court.361 This
option would permit the owner of a food design to opt for design patent
protection or trade dress protection, depending on which protection was
best suited for their commercial needs. It would also honor the underlying
policies of each form of intellectual property.362 Patented design would
become freely available to the public upon the expiration of the patent
term, and trade dress would potentially indefinitely protect against
confusion as to source of the product.

CONCLUSION
Edible intellectual property seems like an unpalatable concept.
Yet recipes and food designs are protectable by a range of intellectual
property rights. As we have seen, some forms of intellectual property are
a better fit than others for recipes and food designs. They are all subject
to limitations, most notably as to their requirements and the scope of rights
they afford. Recipes that are not commonly known and kept confidential
can be maintained as trade secrets and will be protected against
unauthorized use or disclosure and improper acquisition. Protection of
recipes as processes and food designs by means of utility patents is a
potential but difficult fit due to the exacting requirements of novelty and
nonobviousness. Copyright protection of recipes is mostly impossible
except for original expression beyond the facts and procedures of the
recipe itself, and for original compilations of recipes.
Food designs appear to be better suited to protection by design
patents as to their ornamental aspects or, if they are distinctive as to their
source, as trade dress. For food designs, copyright protection is made
impossible by the requirement of fixation and by the difficulty in
separating purely expressive elements from the food design itself. More
notably, this article has explored whether there should be intellectual
property protection for food design at all. An additional question
addressed is whether such broad protection is consistent with the law
governing “articles of manufacture” and aesthetic functionality, and
whether it serves or hinders the purposes of intellectual property protection
and free competition. Especially troublesome is the use of design patent
protection as a backdoor into long-term trade dress protection. Given how
much people relish innovative cooking and unique culinary creations,
these issues are no small potatoes.
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